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The Agricultural Lending Decision: A Multiattribute Analysis
Abstract
The role of commercial bank lending in financing the farm production sector is an issue of growing
importance. During the past several years, farm operators have become more capital intensive, thus requiring
more loans to fund not only seasonal plantings but also capital expansion. While one area of research (Linsj
Penson; Hesser 'and Schuh) has focused on the determinants of aggregate loan demand, subsequent work
(Boehlje and Fisherj Boehlje, Harris and Hoskins) has concentrated on such demand in local financial
markets. Despite this re search on financial market behavior, relatively little has been done to model and
empirically test the decision process of individual lending officers in this market. Existing studies (i.e., Barry,
Baker, and Sanint; Sonka, Dixon, and Jones).have concentrated primarily on.credit analysis of farm firms. The
objective of this paper is to expand on existing research by incorporating the inter acting effects of credit
considerations, market conditions, collateral and pricing into the decision process of the individual loan
officer when faced with an array of farm loan situations.
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The role of commercial bank lending in financing the farm production sector
is an issue of growing importance. During the past several years, farm operat
ors have become more capital intensive, thus requiring more loans to fund not
only seasonal plantings but also capital expansion. While one area of research
(Linsj Penson; Hesser 'and Schuh) has focused on the determinants of aggregate
loan demand, subsequent work (Boehlje and Fisherj Boehlje, Harris and Hoskins)
has concentrated on such demand in local financial markets. Despite this re
search on financial market behavior, relatively little has been done to model
and empirically test the decision process of individual lending officers in this
market. Existing studies (i.e., Barry, Baker, and Sanint; Sonka, Dixon, and
Jones).have concentrated primarily on.credit analysis of farm firms. The objec
tive of this paper is to expand on existing research by incorporating the inter
acting effects of credit considerations, market conditions, collateral and
pricing into the decision process of the individual loan officer when faced with
an array of farm loan situations. A sample of agricultural loan officers were
asked to evaluate hypothetical situations derived from the theoretical model
described in the next section. These simulated loans were generated from" a set
of factorially designed combinations of decision variables. Conjoint measure
ment is then employed to empirically analyze this decision process.
Theoretical Model
This paper studies the determinants of lenders' ranking of loans. Since
the loan size is controlled, the following discussion will focus on the loan of
a dollar. By suitable scaling, the utility model will apply to any pool of loan
applications, each for A dollars. The characteristics of the loan examined in
2this study are: collateral, yield, farm management, repajnnent ability, market
conditions, and loan purpose.
Denote by c the collateral on the,loan, and by r, the yield. Let x be the
cash payments from the borrower to the lender over the period of the loan. Then
the return to the lender, R, can take either one of two forms. First, the loan
does not perform, in which case the lender gets the collateral plus whatever
cash payments, x, occur prior to default. Otherwise, the loan performs, and the
lender gets back his principal 1 and interest r. Thus, the return function for
the lender, R(x), equals the minimum of c + x and 1 + r. This is depicted in
Figure 1. Note the crucial value ofx=l+r-c;at this value, a loan is
just on the. verge of performing.
Now if X were certain it would be an easy matter for the bank to rank
loans: good loans perform, bad loans do not. In most cases, however, x is
random. Indeed, the randomness of x is typically contingent on the remaining
four features: farm management, the borrowing farm's repayment ability, market
conditions, and loan purpose.
Let = management capability of the borrowing farmer; = repayment
ability of the farmer; ~ market conditions facing the farmer; z^ - compliance
of the loan with the lender's loan policy. The conditional probability rela
tionship for Xgiven levels of the z's will be denoted by fCx/Zj^jZ^jZ^jZ^) .
The z's are measured in such a way that an increase in any z should shift the
conditional probability to the right. Better farm management, for instance,
should raise the probability that a loan will perfprm. This is depicted in
Figure 2. To avoid trivialities, we assume that there is always some probabil
ity of non-performance. Denoting by F(x/z jZ^ cumulative probabil













To simplify the notation, let Z represent the vector consisting of the 4
's. If. Z' is greater than Z in at least one component, and at least as great
4as Z in all components, then F(x/Z)<F(x/Z'), where F is the cumulative condi
tional probability function. For example, in Figure 2, F(xq/Z) is positive,
while F(Xq/Z') is zero.
Finally, the attitude of the lender towards risk must be considered.
If the lender's utility function is linear, U(R) = R for return R, then the
lender is risk-neutral.^ The expected utility of a loan to a risk-neutral
lender E(R/Z) is given by:
1+r-c +«
E(R/Z) = / (c+x)f(x/Z)dx + / (l+r)f(x/Z)dx
0 1+r-c (1)
1+r-c
=• cF(l+r-c/Z) + / xf(x/Z)dp + (1+r)[l-F(l+r-c/Z)]
• 0
The first term on the right-hand side of (1) is the expected value of the
collateral,.that is, the collateral times the probability of collecting the
collateral when the loan does not perform. The second term is the expected
default value of the farm project, given that the project does not perform as
a loan and hence the lender collects all the proceeds prior to default. The
third term is the expected value of the loan, given that it does perform, that
is the principal plus interest times the probability of receiving them.
Mathematically one can show that increases in any of the 6 features
increase the expected return to the lender; that is
3E(R/z) V rt £
— >0 for yi = c, r, . ^2)
This is illustrated by a special case in the Appendix.
Empirical Methodology
As specified in the previous section, the agricultural lending officer
examines multiple attributes of a potential farm loan. In this evaluation proc-
I ^ ^
ess, the relationships among the attributes and their effects on loan desirabil
ity are complex as shown in Equation 1. An important question, therefore, in
the analysis of the loan evaluation process concerns the relative effects of
various criteria on the loan application and the degree to which tradeoffs are
made among criteria by the agricultural lending officer.
Due to the complexity of the lender's expected, utility function (1), it is
difficult for the loan officer to express it directly. Consequently, an appro
priate methodology used in this study is conjoint measurement, which concerns
the modeling of utility-based decisions. Conjoint measurement procedures are
designed to decompose an individual's utility responses to multiattribute stim
uli so that the effects of stimulus attributes on the ultimate decision can be
analyzed.2
The development of the critical" loan variables, as specified in the
previous section, was based on existing literature and interviews with senior
lending personnel. These variables and their respective treatment levels are
shown'in Table 1.
Considerable research (Barry, Baker and Sanint; Hanson and Thompson;
Patrick and Eisgruber) has examined farm management ability. Capable management
is obviously preferred. Those areas of farming that have exhibited a vulner
ability to cyclical fluctuations in demand, such as live cattle and hogs, are
likely to be less attractive to the lender than those with greater stability.
6Loan purpose also exerts an influence on the evaluation process. Banks maintain
both external and internal loan policies. A typical external policy is to focus
on economically productive loans which promote growth and viability in the
bank's agricultural market area. This external goal is supplemented by internal
objectives vjfhich include the generation of a loan portfolio that is not only
profitable but also is consistent with the bank's overall strategy. Since banks
are not observed to be single period profit maximizers, a productive loan can be
considered as one in which a long-term profitable relationship with a borrowing
farmer is established or maintained.
Repayment of principal is defined in terms of the ability of the borrowing
farmer to meet his debt service requirements which include both interest and
principal. Gabriel and Baker employ a similar definition when examining finan
cial risk and how it is affected by changes in business risk, Repajrment ability
has been examined within more restrictive analytical models (Hanson and
Thompson; Sonka, Dixon and Jones). Specific repayment alternatives are more
likely affected by the nature of the farmer's financing need. The many alterna
tive borrowing farm situations are difficult to assess effectively and hence are
not tested in this study. Therefore, a more general definition is employed.
All-in-yield terms, which include both the base rate, as well as possible,
compensating balances, and required collateral compose the pricing component of
the decision process. Compensating balances may be considered as part of the
loan-price vector even though they are virtually non-existent in agricultural
lending. Finally, the excess of the market value of pledged security over the
loan amount,, coupled with the liquidity of the collateral, determines the
lender's margin of safety in case of default. Attractive collateral must first
be liquidated quickly without depressing prices. In addition, the greater the
7fluctuation in its market value, the less desirable is collateral to the lender.
Therefore, preference would be for greater liquidity and certainty of value.
Each attribute was measured on three levels (see Table 1), resulting in a
total of 27 combinations based on a fractional factorial design (see Addelman).
The fractional factorial design was constructed so that all two-way interaction
effects among price, management, and collateral could be estimated. The remain
ing interaction terms were confounded.
The six—attribute preference model related to,the fractional factorial
design is as follows:
U =X + M +1. + P + R + C + Y + MY +MC + Y C (3)
miprcy m i p r c ymy mc yc
where U . = overall utility the respondent derives from the alternative that
•miprcy
is characterized as having levels m, i, p, r, c, y for attributes M(manage
ment), I (industry market conditions), P (loan purpose), R (repayment),
C (collateral), and Y (all-in-yield pricing). X equals the mean utility of the
set of alternatives. The remaining variables measure the effect of each of the
loan attributes. For example, refers to the main part-worth of level m of
variable M. The last three terms measure the respective interaction part-
worths.. For example, M Y reflected the M by Y interaction part-worths.
^ ' m y my
OLS regression with effects coding, which is similar to dummy variable
regression procedures for conjoint analysis, has been described in detail by
Moore.^ For each attribute, coded vectors similar to dummy variables are
formed except that the coding is 1,0, -1. For each coded vector, category
membership is identified by assigning I's with all others (except the last
category) being assigned O's. The last category is assigned -l*s. Since each
Rfactor has 3 levels in this study, 2 effect coded vectors are used to represent
each factor.
The regression equation corresponding .to the conjoint measurement model in
equation (3) is:
12
Y = ^ i=l hh " ^ ^ ^ ^6^2^10 ^ ^
^ »19'Vu ^ ^20=^2^12 ^ ^21=^9^11 ^ ^22^^12 " ^23^11 ^
Vl0^2 ,
where 3 = X (the mean utility of the set of alternatives) and the x's represent
o
the treatment effects of the effects coded attributes.^
Using effects coding, 3 in equation (4) equals the grand mean of the
dependent variable. Each of the slope variables is equal to the deviation from
the mean of the group assigned I's in the vector with which it relates to the
grand mean.. Therefore, each of these coefficients reflects a treatment effect
or part-worth. Due to the need to use a fractional factorial design, the tested
interaction effects in equation (3) were among the yield and collateral terms
and the management variable as a summary measure of the credit consideration.
To test whether non-zero interactions are sufficiently large to be attributed
to other than random fluctuation is determined by using the standard hierarchi
cal F-test of the significance of the increase in due to the inclusion of
the interaction terms in the estimate. If the increment over the main effects
component of the model in the proportion of variance accounted for by the inter
action is not significant, it is sufficient to examine the main effects.
Empirical Analysis
A. Sample and Measurement Procedure
A total of 44 agricultural lending officers from 39 midwestern banks of
varying size and location were selected to participate in this study. The
tests were conducted by mailing the card deck representing the 27 loan
situations to each of the loan officers along with instructions regarding the
required task.
All 44 subjects were given an identical deck of cards containing
descriptions of hypothetical loans in terms of the six attributes,
which were based upon the fractional factorial design.
The frame of reference to be used by the loan officer was that an
application for an agricultural loan was being considered.
The subjects were told that the hypothetical loans differed only with
respect to the 6 attributes and were identical in all other factors.
Based on previous research,.these other conditions include loan size,
maturity, bank portfolio conditions, and whether the borrowers were
existing versus new customers.
The subjects were instructed to sort the cards in order of preference
from the most preferred loan situation to the least preferred loan
situation.' Standard sorting instructions were given to the subjects.
B. Aggregate Results
Based on equation (4), OLS regression was used to estimate the aggregate
utility model. These pooled regression results are presented in Table 2. With
an r2 of .743 for the main effects model, the explanatory results indicate a
highly acceptable amount of homogeneity among the participants. All of the main
effects coefficients are significant at the .01 level. Furthermore, none of the
two-way interactions among management collateral and price are statistically
significant. Consequently, only the main effects are interpreted and discussed.
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Using the coefficients for equation (4), the part-worths of equation (3)
can be calculated. Table 3 shows the resulting part-worths and aggregate util
ity functions. Both the relative magnitude and direction of the aggregate func
tions can be observed.^
The direction of the utility functions are consistent with expectations as
specified. However, the results also suggest that the participating lending
t
officers tended to weigh more heavily the negative influence of all the decision
variables. For example, it appears that poor farm management has- a greater
negative influence on the loan decision than the opposing effect of good manage
ment. Such, results could reflect organizational factors generally applicable to
banking. First, the default of a major loan is more costly than the opportunity
cost of .denying a good loan. Less obvious, but probably equally as important,
career rewards and penalties for agricultural lenders may be asymmetrically
biased toward the avoidance of problem loans. If so, the loan officer would
attempt to avoid mistakes even though possibly excellent loan prospects may be
denied. Third, given the limited return for loans tied only to a debt rate,,
the loan.officer must find a means to reject loan applications; thus, a negative
variable takes on additional importance. Also, given that a majority of the
information from the farm borrower is positive, a negative factor' takes on added
importance. Finally, avoiding non-productive loans is a prime item on a good
amount of agricultural loan officers' experience and training. Such training
may enforce a better understanding of denying loan applications than accepting
them. While these reasons have not been empirically validated, they are con
sistent with the role of negative information in other negotiating contexts.
The range of the part-worths for each attribute can be interpreted as an
index of the relative importance of the attribute as a determinant of the
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utility of the stimuli. Examination of the part-worth ranges in Table 3 indi
cates the farm management variable is the most important attribute although it
is not dominant. Repayment assurance and collateral are next in the influencing
of the preference of the loan officers for specific credit situations. Both
loan policy and yield are considerably less important.
The relative magnitudes of the part-worths can be examined in terms of
potential backoffs in the loan decision. For example, the influence of poor
management can be offset by high repayment assurance and collateral. However,
conversely,-excellent management is not enough to compensate for insufficient
evidence of good repayment ability and collateral. The nature of these rela
tionships confirms the lack of importance of pricing in this decision process.
The role of yield has little influence on the outcome of individual decision
processes, which is similar to the conclusion reached by Barry, Baker and
Sanint, Finally, market condition is the least important decision variable.
While stability of the agricultural market is preferred, the results suggest
that the current state of the agricultural market was not important in how the
loan officers ranked the remaining decision variables.
Summary
The principal interest of this paper has been to examine the agricultural
lending process using a more complete set of decision variables. The empirical
testing of a model of a lender's multiattribute utility function confirmed the
hypothesized relationships. Furthermore, the main effects model was sufficient
to explain the decision process.
Two specific results are pertinent to future research into this process.
First, the role of management which had been examined in more restrictive models
12
in previous research is confirmed by the results of this study. However, impor
tant insight is provided into the interaction among a more complete set of
decision variables for agricultural lending than is 'normally accorded in agri
cultural finance texts. In this context, there was a lack of responsiveness of
loan interest rate to varying levels of the credit risk considerations. These
results could be explained by a combination of plausible reasons. Given the
strong influence of other decision variables such as farm management ability and
repayment potential, the interest rate is locked in. Furthermore, the range of
yield alternatives is relatively narrow. While yield may have been more of a
factor in the decision if the range was wider, competition among financial
institutions tends to restrict such a range. Second, loan officers appeared to
have placed a greater emphasis on the negative effect of tl^ese variables which
suggests a prior inclination to deny the farm loan application. While several
reasons for this were suggested, this remains an area of future research.
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Footnotes
1. Obviously, if the lender's utility function is strictly concave, and U(R)
exhibits a positive but diminishing marginal utility, risk aversion can be
illustrated. However, even with this alternative function, it continues to
be explicitly conditional of Z and implicitly on c and v.
2. Recent empirical research indicates conjoint measurements are characterized
by high predictive utility and measurement stability (for example, see
Moore).
3. A fractional factorial design was necessary to make the number of treatment
combinations small enough to be manageable. A full factorial design would
have consisted of 3^ or 729 combinations.
The loan officers' preference ratings consisted of rank order judgments.
The dependent variable, therefore, was measured on an ordinal scale. "Recent
evidence indicates metric analysis of variance or ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression procedures are robust in conjoint measurement applications.
Consequently, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis using effects
coding was used to estimate the part-worth functions in this study.
4. As recommended by Blom, the rank order data for the dependent variable were
normalized by means of a probit transformation. This transformation results
in the rectangular rank order frequency distribution being converted to a




n + 1/4 "
where:
= Probit transformation of the i^^ rank
= Inverse cumulative normal function
R£ = The i^^ rank with 27 representing the first choice
n = Number of stimuli ranked (n=27)
5. The variables through defined as follows:
x, = M X = P ^9 = ^2
""l : ^3 ""6 : ^3 ^10 I ^3
""3 ~h =^7 ^ ^2 ^11: h
""4 ~ ^3 "^8 ^3 12 3
The treatment combinations are effect, coded which results in two coded
vectors per attribute. For example, x^ and are used to reflect the
M treatment levels where:
X, = 0 and x- = 1 to represent treatment level.
xj == .1 and X2 == 0 to represent M2 treatment level.
Xj^ = -1 and X = -1 to represent treatment level.
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6. In pooled conjoint measurement, the response data are pooled across respond
ents and one aggregate utility estimate is obtained. If all the respondents
evaluate identical stimulus objects, this pooled estimate can be interpreted
as an average utility estimate for the group. A potential shortcoming of
this procedure, however, is the "majority fallacy", which is caused by
heterogeneity of individual responses. However, when the group to be aggre
gated is relatively homogeneous, the predictive validity problem is reduced
considerably (Moore). Since the primary purpose of this study involves the
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question of how commercial lending officers in general evaluate loan applica
tions, and since this group represents a relatively homogeneous group of
decision makers, aggregate conjoint analysis procedures were used. The ques
tion of a potential "majority fallacy" was examined by evaluating the coeffi
cient of determination of the estimate, by testing the predictive validity of
the model for a sub-group of the respondents, and by examining subsample
multiattribute utility function differences.
7. The predictive validity of the model was tested by using the aggregate model
to.calculate predicted utilities (predicted probit values) of the nine stimu
lus profiles ranked by each respondent in the re-test. For each individual,
these predicted utilities were correlated with the actual utilities (actual
probit values were calculated by assuming the top ranked card had an ordinal
value of 27). The average of the 23 correlation coefficients, which was
calculated using standard Z-transformation procedures, compares favorably
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Appendix
Let f(x/Z) be a uniform density, with only changes in a single one of the z's
being considered. In particular
f(x/z) = for 'z < X < 1+a+z,
i+a — —
0 otherwise.
Then F(x/z) = 0 for x < z
•r-— for z < X < 1+a+z
1+a — —
1 for 1+a+z < X.
Computing the expected return according to (1), we have
1+r-c
=, 11^ . / . (1- = (2)
(1+r)^ - (z+c)2 ^ l-^r-c-2)
2(l+a) . l+a







thus verifying (2) in this case.
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Table 1
Decision Variables for Agricultural Lending Model
1. Borrowing Farm's Hanagement
High Character and Ability
Average Character and Ability
Low Character and Ability
2. Industry Market Conditions
High Rate of Change
Average Rate of Change
Low Rate of Change
3. Loan Purpose
Highly Productive Loan—Full Compliance with Loan Policy
Average Productive Loan—Full Compliance with Loan Policy
Speculative Loan—Marginal Compliance with Loan Policy
4. Repayment
Highly Assured Source of Repayment—Good Track Record
Average Assurance of Source of Repayment-~Average Track Record
Uncertain Source of Repayment—No Track Record
5. Collateral
Highly Liquid with Certain Value
Average Liquidity and Average Certainty of Value
Illiquid and Uncertain Value
6. Pricing (all in yield)
Prime Plus 4 Points















































^10^12 2.69998 4 .6750 2.90




r2 (Full Model) .74873
ap < .01 •
^Twenty-seven observations were obtained from each respondent resulting in a
total of 1188 observations
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^Part-Worth Values: The part-worth values corresponding levels two and three
of each attribute are equal to the partial regression coefficients correspond
ing to each of those attribute levels. The part-worth values for the level
one of each attribute are calculated as follows:
Pi=-(P2+P3); Ri=-(R2+R3); Ci—(C2+C3); Yi=-(Y2+Y3).
•2 3
